

BUDGET PROCESS: TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

4.3: S. HRG. 103-44

Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. W... **..RING**

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS


FIRST SESSION

BUDGET PROCESS: TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

MARCH 11, 1993



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1993

67-492-4

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-040844-X

BUDGET PROCESS: TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

4. 3. S. HRG. 103-44

Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. W... **RING**

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

BUDGET PROCESS: TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

MARCH 11, 1993



Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress

SUPERINTENDENT
JUL 23 1993

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1993

67-492-

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-040844-X

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS

[Authorized by H. Con. Res. 192, 102d Congress]

SENATE

DAVID L. BOREN, Oklahoma, *Co-Chairman*
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, *Vice Chairman*

JIM SASSER, Tennessee	NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky	TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
HARRY REID, Nevada	TED STEVENS, Alaska
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland	WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas	RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine, *Ex Officio*
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, *Ex Officio*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, *Co-Chairman*
DAVID DREIER, California, *Vice Chairman*

DAVID OBEY, Wisconsin	ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
AL SWIFT, Washington	GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut	BILL EMERSON, Missouri
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina	WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, D.C.	JENNIFER DUNN, Washington

RICHARD A. GEPHARDT, Missouri, *Ex Officio*
ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois, *Ex Officio*

G. KIM WINCUP, *Staff Director*
WALTER OLESZEK, *Policy Director*
KELLY L. CORDES, *Chief Clerk*
JOHN F. DEEKEN, *Professional Staff Member*
C. LAWRENCE EVANS, *Professional Staff Member*
PHILIP W. GRONE, *Professional Staff Member*
NICHOLAS P. WISE, *Professional Staff Member*
MAUREEN GROPPÉ, *APSA Fellow*
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, *CRS Policy Analyst*
JAMES SATURNO, *CRS Policy Analyst*
MARY LOU SMULLEN, *Special Assistant*
SHELLEY GOUGH, *Staff Assistant*
STACEY SPEVAK, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

MARCH 11, 1993

Page

OPENING STATEMENT

Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, a U.S. Representative from the State of Indiana	1
---	---

WITNESS

Hon. William H. Natcher, a U.S. Representative from the Commonwealth of Kentucky	2
Prepared statement	26

APPENDIX

Prepared statement of Hon. Jennifer B. Dunn, a U.S. Representative from Washington	24
Responses to written questions:	
From Hon. Lee H. Hamilton	31
From Hon. Robert S. Walker	42

(III)

BUDGET PROCESS: TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1993

**U.S. SENATE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room SC-5, The Capitol, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. HAMILTON. This morning the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress will continue its series of hearings about reform of the Federal budget process, including relations between the budget authorizations and appropriations process.

Testifying today is one of the most respected members of this institution, Chairman William H. Natcher of the House Committee on Appropriations. He will discuss the role of the Appropriations Committees and the budget process.

Before we begin with his testimony, I'd like to comment on the timing of the Joint Committee's hearings about budget process reform. This is, of course, the budget season for the Congress. The House and the Senate Budget Committees are marking up the budget resolution for the year and floor action on the budget resolution is expected in both chambers by the end of the month.

As the Joint Committee conducts hearings about how to improve the budget process, the budget policy will be the first order of business for the institution as a whole. It's only natural that this larger policy debate will have some impact on the Joint Committee's work, but I hope the impact will be restrained.

Deliberations in Congress about the budget resolution are going to be, as we all know, highly partisan. This Joint Committee, we hope at least, in contrast, is intended to be a bipartisan forum where potential changes in the operations of Congress are considered in a balanced, measured and, we hope, judicious manner.

I'm afraid that if the members of the Joint Committee get bogged down in partisanship over the policy of the budget resolution, then the work of this committee will be much, much more difficult. Therefore, I hope the attention of committee members will stay on issues relating to the budget process, rather than the substantive issues of the budget policy, however timely that may be.

I'm very grateful to Chairman Natcher for his willingness to appear before the Joint Committee. We know that you'll have helpful suggestions for us. We thank you very much for joining us.

I'll ask if any of my other colleagues have any statements they'd like to make at this moment? Vice Chairman Dreier?

Mr. DREIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that I am privileged to be able to join in welcoming Chairman Natcher.

I'm not going to talk about any of the apropos issues that you've mentioned here, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to talk about one that I regularly discuss at this hearing and that's the Rules Committee on which I serve. Mr. Natcher and I, over the past few years, have had the opportunity to discuss his role in the Appropriations Committee as it relates to rules of the House and I simply want to extend my congratulations to him and say that is very refreshing that he consistently believes in open rules when it comes to the appropriations process, avoiding the waivers in the past that have been constantly requested in our appropriations bills. I happen to believe that his chairmanship is one of the best steps towards reform of this institution. I welcome you here.

Mr. HAMILTON. Any other comments?

[No response.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, you may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. NATCHER, A U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY**

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for permitting me to be here at this time. I want to thank you and Mr. Dreier, and all of the members of your committee, especially for your statement concerning the Rules Committee.

Since I've been chairman of the subcommittee that appropriates the money for the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, as you well know, I've never requested a rule, never asked for a rule. I had the District of Columbia for 16 years before that time. My friend Bob Walker, who sits on your left, will tell you I never asked for a rule during that 16 years.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this joint committee which has been given a very important and very difficult job to perform. As you consider the budget process, I want to quickly review the annual appropriations process, what it does and what it doesn't do.

First off, many people don't know that only about one-half of all Federal spending goes through the annual appropriations process. The remainder is mandatory or entitlement spending and interest on the debt. And even though one-half of all spending is appropriated—only 35 percent of the total is truly discretionary. The other 15 percent this is appropriated consists of appropriated entitlements that we cannot easily adjust without changing the authorizing legislation.

For instance, we appropriate funds every year for unemployment compensation, supplemental security income, veterans compensation and pensions, and the like which are entitlements for all practical purposes.

Even though discretionary spending is only 35 percent of the total budget, it is an extremely important part of the budget. Our discretionary budget, Mr. Chairman, pays for the follow: our domestic investments in areas such as health, education, transportation, science, urban and rural development, crime prevention and natural resources; all of our national defense; nearly all Federal administrative expenses; all Federal housing programs; all foreign aid; all national park and recreation programs; all Federal research and development; and a host of other critical activities.

Mr. Chairman for these discretionary programs to operate, appropriations must be enacted each year. This annual review is critical for both controlling spending and holding the Executive Branch accountable for these programs. This also requires our committee and the Congress to produce. I'm proud to say that we have produced on our committee. Year after year, our appropriations bills generally have been enacted on time and, when totalled up each year, are usually under the budget.

In fact, the record shows that the annual appropriations process is the best process we have to control spending. The record has been consistently good, whether there were budget resolutions to set overall ceilings or there were not.

In the 18 years since the Budget Act was enacted in 1974, Congress appropriated a total of \$72 billion less than requested by the Presidents. In the 18 years preceding the budget resolution—from 1957 through 1974—Congress appropriated \$85 billion less than Presidential requests. Since 1945, we have appropriated over \$200 billion less than requested.

Last year was no exception to this excellent record. The total for fiscal year 1993 appropriations bills was \$9.2 billion under President Bush's request for discretionary spending. This included reductions in all three budget categories: \$2 billion in domestic spending; \$6.4 billion in military spending; and \$800 million in international spending.

That's an excellent record, Mr. Chairman, which Congress has not matched for the mandatory spending side of the budget that is, in effect, on autopilot.

Mr. Chairman, every member of your joint committee concerned with the budget should also know these statistics. The CBO tells us that over the last 12 years between 1980 and 1992, appropriated discretionary spending, including defense spending, grew by only 4.8 percent per year. This compares to an increase of 7.0 percent per year for mandatory spending after you exclude savings and loan costs and net interest payments. If you included savings and loan spending and net interest, the rate of increase would be even higher. That is an impressive record, Mr. Chairman, and it shouldn't be forgotten when the budget process is being considered.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Appropriations also works very hard so that we can finish our job on time. We have not needed a broad, long-term Continuing Resolution since 1987. That Continuing Resolution was part of a budget summit deal where it was agreed that one appropriations bill and one reconciliation bill would be presented to the President simultaneously.

Since then, limited, short-term, continuing resolutions have been needed from time to time, but we usually have ended up enacting

all 13 annual appropriations bills very close to the beginning of the fiscal year—October 1.

I believe there are three main reasons why the appropriations process has been effective.

First is the requirement that Appropriations Committee members cannot serve on any other standing committee. This enables our members to devote the time it takes to become experts in their areas and to have the knowledge to make tough choices.

The second reason is the wide perspective Appropriations Committee members must have. Our subcommittees are structured so that many different interests must compete for limited dollars in ways they don't have to do in the authorizing process.

A third reason is the heavy emphasis on budget totals and fiscal policy that is required in the appropriations process because of the unified budget. We are very conscious of our totals and spend a great deal of the time adjusting and refining our bills to make things fit.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the dual authorizing-appropriations structure that has been in place for many years sets up a pretty good balance between the emphasis on detailed program knowledge and advocacy that exists in the authorizing committees and the emphasis on program knowledge and fiscal control in the Appropriations Committee. Authorizing committees push their programs and the Appropriations Committee makes the necessary tough choices between competing needs. It's a good basic structure. Both perspectives are needed.

There is a different result, however, when these two perspectives are combined in one place. In almost every instance where these two functions have been combined, program advocacy wins out over budget control. The proof of this is our mandatory spending budget which has not been controlled as well as it should have been.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, this Joint Committee would make a significant contribution towards better budget control if it recommended tighter rules and procedures designed to shift more mandatory spending to the discretionary spending category so that these funds are reviewed from two different perspectives.

The appropriations process is important from another perspective as well. It affords every member of Congress—through actions in the bills, language in the reports, and colloquies on the Floor—a very effective way to participate in the implementation of policies, programs and priorities of nearly every agency of Government each and every year.

It is important to the Legislative Branch and our constitutional form of government that we have this opportunity to exercise this type of review and oversight each year.

The appropriations process is not without its problems. We suffer from too many non-germane and legislative amendments to appropriations bills, especially amendments added on the Floor of the other body.

I think, however, this will prove to be a problem of the past. A major reason for legislative amendments on appropriations bills has been the fact that the Presidents and Congress could not get together and agree on a host of issues that were addressed in many

different authorizing bills over the last 12 years. With only a few exceptions, there has been deadlock between our authorizing committees and the Presidents.

You can go down the list—crime, energy, health, science, banking, education, urban development, environment—all have been slowed up or stopped cold. This impasse sometimes results in our friends on the authorizing committees asking the Appropriations Committee to include legislation in our must-pass appropriations bills.

Mr. Chairman, the American people want this legislative gridlock to end. We all know that. And it is going to end, along with much of the frustration of the authorizing committees. Mr. Chairman, I believe our authorizing committees are going to be re-energized this year, and the problem of legislating in appropriations bills will be greatly diminished. This is all to the good.

If we combine this new attitude with procedural changes to require that multi-year authorizations be enacted prior to the budget year, it would serve the Congress and the people well. This would strengthen the authorizing process by getting many of our authorizing committees back in the driver's seat since a framework would be in place before the start of the fiscal year against which the President and the Appropriations Committee could make budget decisions.

A way to go about this might be to require through an iron-clad rule that all funding authorizations be in place prior to the budget year and be for a minimum of two years, with no exceptions. This would have the advantage of having the President submit a budget based on enacted authorization. It would also enable the legislative committees to submit views and estimates to the Budget Committee based on existing legislation rather than proposed legislation.

This could be enhanced further by enacting a permanent, generic funding authorization for all authorized programs which deems the authorized level to be the last dollar amount enacted into law—even if the funding authorization for a program has expired. Such a permanent, generic authorization would give an added incentive to the authorization committees to complete their work, since this permanent authorization ceiling would be come tighter and tighter as time goes by. It would also allow the Appropriations Committee to move without going to the Rules Committee so often.

In conclusion, the part of the budget that works is the appropriations process. While things can always be improved, Congress should be extremely careful in changing the one process that has a proven track record in living within tight budget totals and making tough budget decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to work with this committee in any way that I can to help you successfully complete your important task.

Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear at this time.

In addition to that, I want to thank you and all of the members who sit on your left and right in the House, and with the goodwill of you gentlemen from the Senate, for the help you've given me since I was elected chairman of our committee.

I've served on this committee now for 38 years and, Mr. Chairman, you'll recall several months ago when the question arose about who was to be the chairman, you knew and everyone that knows me knows, I couldn't run against my friend Jamie Whitten. Jamie Whitten has been my friend for 39 long years; I couldn't run against him, Mr. Chairman, if I never became chairman of the committee, never.

With your help and the help of all the members in the House on both sides and the leadership, and especially Tom Foley, the Speaker, we worked it out. With the help of all the members on the Appropriations Committee on both sides of the aisle, we brought our 13 bills out, passed them. We had no Continuing Resolution, a little three or four day resolution. As I said to my friend, Bob on the Senate side, we don't want any Continuing Resolution, this year or every. We want to send these bills down to the President one by one, let him look at them, and sign them or veto them.

Mr. Chairman, I've had a lot of help. Everyone has helped me. This has given me an opportunity to thank you and all the members for helping. I appreciate it.

[Mr. Natcher's prepared statement appears in the Appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Chairman Natcher, there's no member of the United States Congress that has deeper affection, esteem and respect than you do. We are just pleased indeed for your gracious comments and they are reciprocated in every way. We have great respect for you as chairman and we thank you for your appearance this morning.

I'm going to make one request and then I'll go by order of call here. Mr. Walker will ask the first questions.

You had a statement in your testimony with respect to mandatory spending and discretionary spending. You said that tighter rules and procedures designed to shift more from mandatory spending to discretionary spending would be useful. I'll not ask you to spell those out for me now, but let me just say we would appreciate very much receiving from you and your staff the specifics of rules and procedures that you have in mind there to bring that about. Could you arrange to do that in the future for us?

Mr. NATCHER. I will do it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. We appreciate it.

We'll begin the questions with Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Chairman Natcher, for your testimony before this committee today. I do appreciate the fact that over the years you have been one who has brought his appropriation bills to the floor in a way where we can amend them if we feel that is necessary and we have. The rules of the House really work. I certainly hope that pattern is going to continue as we bring the supplemental appropriation forward in the next couple of weeks.

I guess my concern is that as an authorizer, I believe you are right that a dual track process would work well. However, it has become less than a dual track process in recent years. What we have seen is that a large number of policy decisions end up being made in appropriation bills. Whether it results from something that happens in the House or whether it results from something that happens in the Senate, the fact is that we authorizers see a

large number of our policy decisions being made elsewhere and for a variety of reasons, not all of them related to the interaction between the legislative and the executive. Let me give you one statistic here that bothers me.

In the 102nd Congress, 20 of the 26 appropriations bills brought to the floor, either as appropriations bills, plus three supplemental bills, waived Rule 21, Clause 2, which prohibits consideration of unauthorized appropriations and legislation in general appropriations bills. In other words, consistently, the rules of the House were not followed when it came to the question of putting legislation in appropriations bills. Consistently, the Appropriations Committee came up and asked for those waivers.

If, in fact, we simply obeyed the rules of the House as presently structured, many of these problems would go away as well, but those rules are not being followed and waivers are being granted. As a result, the authorizers are cut out of the process.

I'd just appreciate your comment on that.

Mr. NATCHER. Well, I would say to you, Mr. Walker, that a great many instances that you cited have occurred down through the years have been mistakes on the part of the Appropriations Committee. I say that to you frankly. You know, sometimes the chairman of an authorizing committee will direct a letter to us, talk to us, and say I can't get it out; I would appreciate it if you'd put it in.

Mr. Walker, last year, if you recall, we had a matter on the floor concerning your committee where there were a number of projects in the appropriations bill and they were removed on amendments. Then they were placed in another appropriations bill and they succeeded in going through.

This is no secret, Mr. Walker. The Speaker of the House, after a number of the chairmen on authorizing committees, legislative committees, appeared before him and asked him to meet with us, and he did, he resolved this problem I think once and for all.

We met with him, it took place, it should not have happened, and the agreement now is there will be no legislation in an appropriations bill, none. We have two members right now that have letters before our subcommittee that want to come in. I've said to them frankly, we can't put you in.

The agreement was, Mr. Walker, as a result of what came from your committee, that there will be no legislation on appropriations bills. On the Senate side, if the Senate places legislative appropriations in a bill, we will notify the authorizing committee 24 hours in advance, the Appropriations Committee does, on the Senate side, they've added legislation giving that authorizing committee and that authorizing chairman a chance to prepare himself.

The question arose as to whether or not there would be authorizing committee members in the conference with the Appropriations Committee. We said, Mr. Speaker, we don't want that to happen; we want only members of the Appropriations Committee on the conference. He said all right, then keep it clean. If you do, you're all right. So, Mr. Walker, I believe now, with what took place as a result of the matters that you know well about, that is going to stop a lot of it.

Mr. WALKER. So we will see no requests for waivers of Rule 21, Clause 2 any longer, is that my understanding?

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Walker, I hope that takes place and that is the situation. As far as I personally am concerned, as one member of the committee, I want to see it happen. I want to see it happen and that's the way to operate. That's the fair and the right way to do it. It can be done.

On our side, some of the members don't like it. One of the members said to me the other day, if you wanted to, in this bill, you could put this in. I said, yes, but that violates the agreement that we made and it's not the right thing to do. We've gone too far on the appropriations bills in a lot of instances, but I have a letter in my file on a bill that's going to come up from the chairman of an authorizing committee saying, I can't get it out of my committee, I want you to put it in an appropriations bill.

Mr. WALKER. I hope that doesn't happen because that's part of the problem. The members of the committee have been taken out of the process if the chairman can do an end run and come to the Appropriations Committee and get done what their committee won't do. I thank you for your leadership in that.

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Walker, each year, for a number of years, we would bring out our bill, you would ask me each year, any legislation in this bill? If it was, I'd tell you; you never had any problem with it, never had any problem with it, and we'd take it out.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Dreier?

Mr. DREIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join in extending congratulations to you for this very important testimony. I think the exchange that you just had with Mr. Walker is a reaffirmation of rules of the House that is going to be very important as we proceed this year.

You talk about half the problem being able to be addressed by your committee and I can only infer from that it is going to be difficult for the other half to be addressed—mandatory spending, interest on the debt and entitlements.

Without getting into details of this budget question, as Chairman Hamilton has requested of us, how do you propose that we, in restructuring, get at that other half?

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Dreier, if I had my way, we'd never pass another bill through the Congress of the United States that did not have a sunset provision in it. We'd never pass another one. I think all entitlements, all entitlement programs should be put right up on the table and we should take a look at all of them. Right now, I think this is a good time to do it or take those off in social security, take them off. I think that's the system we ought to use.

As far as entitlement programs open-ended, I don't think we should ever do it. I think every bill should have a time, it should have a sunset provisions of five years. If it's good legislation, let's reauthorize it. If it's not, let's stop it.

That is not a direct answer to your question, but I can tell you that is the procedure we should start with.

Mr. DREIER. It is a very direct answer, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me it might be one that could alienate a constituency. I'm sure that the statement you just made could be interpreted by some who

are beneficiaries of these entitlements as an attack on those entitlements. I think it is a very bold thing that you have said.

Frankly, most of us recognize that it is going to be tough for us to turn the corner on this \$4 trillion national debt, with \$300 billion deficits if we don't begin to look, as you said, at that half that is tough for you to address.

Mr. NATCHER. That is correct, and I agree with you. I think now is the time to do it.

Mr. DREIER. So what would you propose that this committee do then specifically to deal with that? You're saying that we should take every single, so-called entitlement—we couldn't deal with the interest on the debt.

Mr. NATCHER. I think it would be good if this committee would establish a policy as far as the future is concerned on authorizing legislation, fixing a time in it with a sunset provision, in other words, not any open-ended legislation. Bring it to a close by virtue of the fact that every 5 years, you'd have to take another look. Make it mandatory. Take another look at it regardless of what it is. If it's good legislation, let's reauthorize it and carry it on into the future.

Mr. DREIER. By refusing to allow legislating in appropriations bills, you have stood up in behalf of those authorizing committees, but your proposal to look at multi-year authorizations could, in fact, jeopardize the authority and the jurisdiction these authorizing committees could have and could further strengthen your committee. How do you propose that we address that?

Mr. NATCHER. I don't think, Mr. Dreier, that it would take anything away from an authorizing committee to have an authorization bill for one year instead of 2, 3 or 4 years. I think it's good to have it for one year for the authorizing committee. Let it be authorized, in certain instances, for one year. Let the committee reauthorize it. Bring it out for the next year if it's good. I don't think that would take a thing away from them. In other words, it would help us on the Appropriations Committee in the appropriating process. I think it would help the authorizing committee. I think it would be for the best interest of the Congress.

Mr. DREIER. Let me follow on with one item that has gotten a great deal of public attention—you and I have discussed this privately in the past—this issue of the line item veto.

President Clinton supports it, 85 percent of the American people support it based on public opinion surveys. I know the constitutional question and separation of powers argument that has continued to come forward.

Could you share with this committee your thoughts on the issue of the line item veto?

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Dreier, if President Clinton would serve as President from now on for the next 10, 15 or 20 years, I might be for a line item, I might be. I think he's a very bright man, I think he's a sincere man. I might be for it. He's not going to serve any 10 or 15 years, you and I know.

I'm not for a line item veto. If you'd tell me who the President was going to be and how long he was going to serve, I might be able to talk to you a little better about it. I think the present system is the best.

Mr. DREIER. President Clinton, by the way, will be President for another 3 years basically.

[Laughter.]

Mr. NATCHER. I'll tell you, I'd hate to run against him.

[Laughter.]

Mr. NATCHER. Anyway, Mr. Dreier, I'm against line item veto.

Mr. DREIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Just so members know, the order of questions will be Mr. Spratt, Senators Boren, Lugar, Stevens, Kassebaum, and Reid.

Mr. Spratt?

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Natcher, thank you for your fine testimony and appearance here.

You say in your testimony that one of the reasons for the successful appropriations budgeting process is that there is a heavy emphasis on budget totals, you are very conscious of the totals and spend a great deal of time adjusting to them. Are you referring here to the budget function totals?

Mr. NATCHER. Yes. As you well know, the Budget Committee will fix the amount, \$3.514 trillion. We stay under it. With our 602 process, we divide it up on our committee, we make sure that we stay under it. Last year, for instance, with your help and the help of everyone in the House, we passed 13 appropriations bills, \$9 billion under the President's request. We have complied now with the requirements concerning totals and concerning our 602(b) allocation. That, in substance, is what I have in mind.

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think that the 602(b) allocation process and the budget resolution process adds strength to the appropriations process, keeping you within boundaries?

Mr. NATCHER. I certainly do. I think it has helped.

Mr. SPRATT. With respect to entitlements, you seem to refer to the fact that we need to take them off autopilot and we need to budget entitlements just as we budget our mandatory spending programs. Could you share with us your ideas of how we might do that?

Mr. NATCHER. In other words, we'd have to first take a look at all of them. I think we'd have to just put them up on the table. The entitlements, we would reauthorize, we would take one that should not be entitlements, pass the necessary laws taking care of that, but as far as the overall program is concerned, I'm against entitlements. I'm just against entitlements. I say that to you frankly, so it would be a process through the authorizing committees now. We'd have to take a look at them, those that should be reauthorized would be reauthorized, those that shouldn't, drop them.

Mr. SPRATT. Do you think that we should add the entitlements to the annual budgeting process, not make the reconciliation something exceptional?

Mr. NATCHER. I think it would be all right.

Mr. SPRATT. Having a total for all entitlements and then allocating those among the major entitlements?

Mr. NATCHER. When you say have a total, now, in other words, that's what we are doing. As far as having a total, we know what the total amount is for the entitlement program. We have it, realizing that it's only 35 percent of the budget that we can handle.

Mr. SPRATT. So we don't control the total? We don't have so-called capped entitlements for most of the entitlement program? We let them run according to demand and eligibility rules that are laid out. When we have a recession, the expenditures go up; when we have good times, they tend to come down.

Are you suggesting that we should try to focus on an aggregate amount for entitlements for the coming fiscal year and then allocate these among medicaid, medicare, food stamps?

Mr. NATCHER. I don't know that you can do that. I don't know that you can successfully do that. What I would like to say to you as far as entitlements, and I'm repeating myself, is I think that over half of them should be deleted. I don't think there's any question about it—maybe more than that.

In the budget process and the appropriations process, I don't think that three-fourths of the money should be fixed in concrete. I don't think that it should be fixed and cannot be handled. On the subcommittee that I'm chairman of, Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, our discretionary money is about \$62 billion. The total is about \$468 billion. Therefore, you can see as far as discretionary money, the part that we can handle.

I think all of them, I think the total amount, ultimately through legislation, should be under the control of the Congress and under the control of the committees.

Mr. SPRATT. You describe the authorizing committees in your testimony as advocates and seem to suggest your committee, the Appropriations Committee, has a sense of the budget and a sense of the limits of what can be spent. Do you think it would be useful if the Appropriations Committee had more annual control over totals for entitlements?

Mr. NATCHER. No, I don't. I don't think that the Appropriations Committee should have more control over the amount of the entitlements. I think that should be a matter for the House and the Senate and all of the committees. I don't think that the Appropriations Committee should have that authority. That's what I object to. It's too much under the entitlement program. It's too much of the money that's mandatory that we can't touch and that's a mistake, I think.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Boren.

Senator BOREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Natcher, I want to join in welcoming you on behalf of the members of the Senate side of the Capitol to this committee today and to tell you what you already know, that there is not only great admiration and respect for you on the House side, but on the Senate side as well, and the integrity with which you've carried out your duties in keeping the appropriations process moving through a very, very critical time of transition. We have great appreciation for what you've done.

I'm really encouraged to hear several of the things you said today. One, about trying to keep authorizing off appropriations bills and I think on the Senate side, we perhaps are a major source of that problem as we go into conference, and also the comments you've just made about entitlements. I agree with you completely. We need to have some sort of sunset provision and at least as to

some of them, maybe we can handle it in the budget resolution that they not grow faster than the population growth of the cost of living without us looking at it and making some exception.

I agree with you that mainly there needs to be a scrutiny, an on-going scrutiny of these programs. You just can't take that much of the budget off the table and not look at it until 10 or 20 years until there is some crisis part of it instead of looking at it every year or two as we do with the normal appropriating and authorizing process on discretionary spending. So I applaud what you've said.

I want to ask you about a couple of other items. One, one of the problems we have particularly on the Senate side—I don't know if you have it as much on the House side—we vote on the same issue in the same Congress over and over and over and over again. Whether it's a B-1 bomber, you can think of a whole series of issues, and we'll vote on it maybe 30 or 40 times in the course of a year. It keeps coming up. It comes up on the authorizing, you have the full debate, particular on say defense programs. An appropriations bill comes along and you have the same full debate again on it and they may be only two weeks apart.

I wonder if you have any thoughts about how we can set up some kind of system so that we don't spend so much time refighting the same issue over and over and over and over again within the same period of months? Is there any way that we might avoid that? Do you avoid it on the House side?

Mr. NATCHER. No, Senator, we don't, and we should. You'd have to reorganize your authorizing committees if you're going to avoid it. You're going to have to have a reorganization of your authorizing committees on the House side. As you know, we have 22 committees. I don't know how you would keep it from coming up time after time after time unless you'd have a little reorganization of the authorizing committees. I think you'd have to go in on your authorizing committee reorganization if you're going to prevent it.

Senator BOREN. Right. You know some State legislators have a rule that once decided, it's decided for the year or whatever. You cannot bring up the same issue again and the Chair will rule whether the substance of it is indeed the same issue over again. You're right, we have to make sure the authorizing committees don't keep bringing it up again and again as well.

I know you've talked, obviously enforcing the rule as you intend to enforce it, that if an authorizing committee can't get something done, the Chair of that committee can't run around to the back door and plead with you, as often happens, and we know how the appropriators get caught on this, with pleas made to the Appropriations Chairman, and we see this on the Senate side as well—we couldn't get it out of our committee, so stick it in the authorization bill. Then usually the very same people that want you to stick it in, once the authorizing committees get exercised, say how in the world did the Appropriations Committee start to deal with our business. You sort of get it coming and going.

Other than locking in, I think you suggest freezing, if an authorization bill doesn't pass. There have been years when we've not been able to pass the authorization bills. What has happened on the Senate side is the authorizing committees try to put a lot of it

into the appropriations bills, they ask the Appropriations Committee to do this very often.

Other than freezing the amount and not allowing any increased appropriation for a function that has not been reauthorized, and in following that rule that you talked about, the letter and the spirit of the rule, is there any other way we can bring leverage to the process to make sure the authorization bills are passed in a timely fashion so that we won't be tempted to deal with authorization on appropriations bills?

Mr. NATCHER. Well, yes. I think that this committee, in its final action and report, could stipulate as to time as far as authorizing committees are concerned, legislation, fixing a time. We have a fixed time on appropriations bill. I think it would be good to fix the time as far as authorizing committees are concerned. We don't have it on the House side. It would help us on the Appropriations Committee if we had that, so it would have to be a matter of fixing the time and having a set rule. It's wide open on the House side, Senator, as you know.

Senator BOREN. That's a very good idea.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Lugar?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Natcher, you've already given testimony on the line item veto and I do not wish to antagonize you unduly but let me just raise this scenario for those of us who are not appropriators.

From time to time, in the dead of the night at the end of a session, what appears to happen in the conference of appropriators is the addition of items of interest to members who are around the table or perhaps their friends. As you've suggested, we are under some pressures of this variety.

Without picking on the Lawrence Welk home still that came to the attention of many members several days or even weeks after the deed. One of the rationales for the line item veto is there ought to be someone—maybe the President of the United States thinking in terms of all of the people—who offers some cleanup of the process so that those items that members really do not consider and in fact, which may embarrass the whole system, can be excised.

What is the answer to that? You've suggested one answer would be that appropriators would rigorously stick to what has been authorized and items that are extraneous, even from their own constituencies. That must be a temptation on occasion but would not enter into this situation. What can this committee do to pin that down or can we do anything? As a practical matter, you've had more experience in this than nearly any other human being.

Mr. NATCHER. Well, Senator, let me say this to you, I've served with nine Presidents since I've been a member of Congress. I served with two or three of them that if they were in office and could stay in office, I'd be for a line item veto. Some of them I wouldn't be as far as these projects they put in.

You know, I've seen this done, Senator, since I've been a member of Congress. I've seen some Presidents pay off some of their debts by virtue of their action on appropriation bills. I've seen that happen. If we had line item veto and they'd say, here's something that the House added or the Senate has added, it's in there and if

they think it's in the best interest of this country, and this President said, it's not in the best interest of me, my election and what took place in my election, I'll just take that out. I see so many ways and so many things that could happen that shouldn't happen as far as a line item veto is concerned. It depends on the individual.

Senator if you were the President, knowing you like I do—I don't say this to make you feel good—then I'd be for line item veto if you were down there because I believe you'd do it right. I'm just a little afraid that some of them wouldn't, so therefore, as far as just opening it up and saying we're going to have a line item veto, I don't approve of it. It depends on who is in that White House and how it's handled.

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate that point. Partisanship could be played and pettiness.

Mr. NATCHER. Absolutely.

Senator LUGAR. I think all of us are trying to guide the system in so that there's greater public confidence that somehow or other strange things do not occur that embarrass the system.

Mr. NATCHER. Senator, if you'll permit me, I'd like to digress just a minute here and it's not in line with what you mentioned. I got here just a few years after the Army Committee and the Navy Committee were consolidated. Carl Vinson of Georgia was still here. He, as you know, established the all-time record in the House for seniority until Jamie Whitten surpassed his record.

They had to have police officers, they tell me, out in the halls taking care of the lobby. You've never seen anything like it in your life, competition between the Army and the Navy. Jack May of Kentucky, Chairman of the Army Committee; Carl Vincent, Chairman of the Navy Committee, they finally settled that matter. It was a disaster. They settled it by putting it together and Carl Vincent had the seniority and he became the chairman. That's not in direct line with what you're talking about but that shows you what can happen now.

Senator LUGAR. That's very interesting from a historical perspective.

Mr. NATCHER. Yes. That's how they went together. You know what happened to Jack May, Senator.

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Senator REID. I don't know. What happened?

Mr. NATCHER. Jack May was indicted, sentenced and went to the penitentiary.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Natcher, let me just ask one more question that has to do with an overall consideration we've been studying. That is, should one layer of the process that now is perhaps three layers of budget authorization and appropriation be cut out? From your experience, is it possible that somehow or other the Budget Committee and the authorizers might be combined or the authorizers and the appropriators, or do you feel that the current situation of three tiers is either inevitable or desirable?

Mr. NATCHER. You know, at times, certain matters have come up, Senator, when I believed that maybe we didn't need the Budget Committee. I'd get a little mad about something that happened and I'd say well, we don't need the Budget Committee. We just don't

need the committee at all, we get along fine without it. Until a better system is perfected, proposed and adopted, you'd better let it stay just like it is, unless something better is perfected.

The Budget Reform Act, as you and I know, passed in 1974, when you get right down to it, the Budget Committee has one major obligation and purpose under the law and that's about it. That's fixing the overall amount of the budget. When you get right down to it, that's about what it is. A lot of times suggestions are made in reports and all that shouldn't apply, and maybe shouldn't be placed in there.

Last year, \$1.514 trillion was fixed by the Budget Committee. We don't exceed it, but until a better system is perfected, you'd better let it stay just like it is.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Stevens?

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Chairman Natcher, I came over just as a matter of courtesy but I'm compelled to join in your defense, a little bit, I think, about this line item veto situation. I guess we appropriators do have a similar point of view on that but I don't see any suggestions that individual titles could be deleted from legislation. I don't see suggestions that the kind of provisions we all know sneak into finance bills, the tax bills, could be deleted by a President. I must say, I've seen many more provisions in tax bills that ought to be vetoed than I have in appropriations bills.

We constantly get accused, as you know, in the defense area of appropriations of having nonauthorized appropriations. As a matter of fact, my memory is that four out of the last eight years, we didn't have an authorization bill by the time we acted on the appropriations bill. In foreign assistance, we didn't have a bill for three years running.

If they want to create a point of order against nonauthorized appropriations, it would bring the Government to a halt very quickly with the delays that occur in the legislative process.

I would just ask you one thing. Don't you think there's a valid reason, in some instances, for unauthorized appropriations? I remember the earthquakes and floods and disasters in my State, the Exxon Valdez where many people on the Appropriations Committee assisted us in getting money immediately to deal with that matter. It was right after a recess, an Easter recess.

We've had so many different things that people object to and would be subject, I think, to a line item veto in a political sense, as you mentioned, if it were not for the power of Congress to deal with emergencies as they occur.

Mr. NATCHER. Senator, I agree with you. You serve on the Appropriations Committee and you are one of the able members on that committee. I say that to you frankly. You know and I know that the Refugee Program has not been authorized in five years. That's just one of them I can pick out. That's an important program, it's really important. We put the money in each year. The authorizing committee says, we can't bring out a bill, we just can't bring one out, and I can name and you can name several others, if we carry in appropriations bills, programs we have to carry. We do it, the authorizing committees don't object to it—they can't bring it out—

and they ought to. They ought to go ahead and reauthorize these programs and put us in a position where we are doing it right.

Senator STEVENS. I remember one continuing resolution that had so many pages by the time we were through, it had the crime bill, I think it had the agriculture bill that year, in addition to the appropriations for both of those areas. Yet, the same people that brought us those bills in those years complain now about unauthorized activity in the appropriations process.

I really think that the concept this committee ought to be dealing with the structure of the Congress and not trying to deal with the contents of bills.

Thank you.

Mr. NATCHER. I agree with you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Chairman Natcher, you are legendary for really holding very firm to no legislating on appropriations and I think that you have made that a hallmark of the House. It has been an endless debate we get into in the Senate and it hasn't totally stifled the debate in the House, but I think that you've been able, by sheer will, to really make it work effectively there.

I've been frustrated, as many have mentioned here as well, at sort of the duplication of debate and the endless reinventing of the wheel. I thought you made some interesting suggestions of ways that may help move that process along. I think the fact that you would support mandatory sunseting of even entitlements certainly has merit that we should consider. I think that you suggested perhaps bringing the authorizing and the appropriating process more in sync, you suggested perhaps every year.

Would you be supportive of a two-year budgeting-appropriating-authorizing cycle; instead of one year, appropriate every two years?

Mr. NATCHER. Most States, as you well know, Senator, that have a two-year budget that fix their limit at two years have all kinds of trouble. They have special sessions of the legislature to decide this, to decide that, and to decide the other.

If I understand your question, a two-year budget, I think we'd have all kinds of trouble. I don't think that it would work; I think it would be the same situation that some of the States are having right now where they're having special sessions of the legislature just really to interpret and to decide what they meant when they put it in a two-year budget.

I think the system that we have now as far as the appropriating process, one year, I think it's the best.

Senator KASSEBAUM. We'd probably have even more supplements if we move to two years perhaps.

Mr. NATCHER. That's right.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That's interesting.

When it was asked about the Budget Committee, what would you think—because I think we would feel now we do need that structure that sets a framework of our budget, whether it has worked as desired when it was set up in 1974—what would you think about a committee that would be like a leadership committee composed of the chairmen and ranking members that would meet to put together the budget? The budget would not be a separate committee, but would actually be the chairman and the ranking members of

all of the committees that would meet with some additions selected to keep the majority in proportion, that would set the priorities, that would give the chairman obviously a lot of additional leadership for their own committee as they negotiate with other chairmen for that framework?

Mr. NATCHER. Senator, with some of the deficiencies of maybe the Budget Committee that we complain about from time to time, and the system we're using, if we should continue that system or put in place a leadership system whereby the chairmen of the committees, I would say to you, I would take the budget process just like it is with the Budget Committee holding their hearings on the House side—I don't know how it would be on the Senate side—that leadership group that you'd put together would all depend on the chairmen of the committees and what committees they had as to their inputs. Some of them would have a little more influence than I'd want them to have, to be frank with you. They might have a little more influence than I'd want them to have. So when you say you're going to put them in the room, with 22 standing committees in the House and the chairmen, I don't know whether that would suit me or not to be honest with you.

So if you'd say to me, we won't change it, we'll leave it like it is, I'd say leave it like it is.

Senator KASSEBAUM. My time has run out. Can I ask another question?

Mr. HAMILTON. Go ahead, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. No, it leads to reorganization again and I have a feeling I know what the chairman would say.

Thank you very much.

[Laughter.]

Mr. NATCHER. You know, I'm one of your admirers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator Reid?

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, as I reflect back on my service in the House, which were some of the most pleasant years of my life, one of the reasons it was so pleasant is you, as one of the senior members of the House, was always such a gentleman and such a help to me. I appreciate that and want to tell you that now.

Mr. Chairman, I think that we spend a lot of time talking about things we can solve anyway, we just don't want to do it. My good friend, the very excellent Senator from Indiana—no, it was Senator Boren. I'm sorry, it was Senator Boren, another friend of mine, who talked about matters coming up all the time, time after time. Well, if anybody brings anything up, once they sit down or you get the floor, you can move to table just like that and that ends it real quick. There are ways of disposing of things, not very gentlemanly maybe but there are ways of disposing of things.

I would also say that line item veto, we continually hear about Lawrence Welk's home, but the fact of the matter is, we now have a process in effect that takes care of things like that. As you know, Lawrence Welk's home wasn't rebuilt or refurbished or whatever the story was because we have a process that allows the President, even today, through the rescission process to send things back to us. Isn't that right?

Mr. NATCHER. Yes, you're right, Senator. When you mentioned the \$500,000 that was in that bill, Senator, you and I know that was a mistake.

Senator REID. And it was taken care of and not a penny of it was ever spent.

Mr. NATCHER. That's right. You and I know it was a mistake to put it in there.

Senator REID. And things like that happen every year and every year, through the rescission process or other processes, they are knocked out time after time, is that not right?

Mr. NATCHER. That is correct.

Senator REID. I remember there was some money given to a school, as you recall, two years before that, and not a penny of that was ever spent. So again, in my opinion, and I'm so happy to see somebody of your stature say that the line item veto is just, in effect, a way for us to try to not solve some of the more difficult problems that face us like we're spending more money than we bring in. That's the main problem we have. Right?

Mr. NATCHER. Yes, sir. I don't disagree with that, Senator. Sometimes, I wonder what the historians are going to say about the national debt. People ask me why do we owe \$4.3 trillion. That's an easy answer. To me it is—war in Vietnam, 10½ years, no increase in taxes. We had that war, month after month, \$2.5 billion a month; as far as the Cold War is concerned, the Soviet Union, about \$3 billion.

I would say that the President in office at that time made a mistake. I wouldn't say they made a mistake. I say that to you frankly. I don't know what was going to happen to us. It cost a lot of money, the war, the Cold War did. Historians may have trouble deciding as to whether or not the President in office at that time was right.

I'm digressing with you a bit, Senator, but I'm not one of those that says that. I'd say that to you frankly.

Senator REID. I appreciate that. Also I was happy to hear your question on the leadership question because if that were in effect, you would have a 1990 budget summit agreement every year. That is an agreement that most of us didn't participate in that was just, in effect, done by someone else.

Mr. Chairman, also, I'm sure you've read it and your staff has read it, and I would recommend this to every member of this reorganization committee. Last year, the Hoover Institute and a man by the name of John Kogan, who I might say to my Republican friends, served for about 10 years in the Republican administrations here during the last decade, has written a very wonderful piece about the Federal budget deficits and what's wrong with the congressional budget process.

One of the things he makes very clear in this publication is that the appropriations process should be handled by the Appropriations Committee because we, as a country, tried it a different way in a period of time in history in this country from about 1885 to about 1915 and it simply didn't work. If you think the country is bankrupt now, you should have seen it then when the authorizing committees had no limits whatsoever other than to spend as much money as they wanted. I would recommend this to you.

I have another question, Mr. Chairman, I'll submit to the chairman in writing and ask that at his opportunity, he would submit the answer to us. It relates to some of the things we need to do on this committee and I'd appreciate your response.

Mr. NATCHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. HAMILTON. Ms. Dunn?

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if I might submit an opening statement for the record?

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered.

[Ms. Dunn's statement appears in the Appendix.]

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much.

Chairman Natcher, I'm delighted that you're here before our committee. We've had testimony from some pretty terrific people over the last few weeks and it's great to see you here to add to that list.

Senator Byrd testified before us a few weeks back and he talked a lot about the fractured attention of the members of Congress, how it was tough for them to focus on their issues, the topics that were of great concern, both to the Congress and also to the people who elected us.

You have mentioned that the Appropriations Committee is effective partly because members only serve on that one committee. I'm wondering if you would support a reorganization of the committee system so that the model of appropriations could be used with other committees?

Mr. NATCHER. Yes, I could recommend that to you. You and I know on Appropriations and on Ways and Means, you serve only on one committee. I could recommend that, yes, as far as using our committee as the model, as I understand your question.

Ms. DUNN. You might see subcommittees being moved under overall committees and certain overall committees combined, that sort of thing?

Mr. NATCHER. Well, we have 13 subcommittees on our Committee on Appropriations and from time to time on our full committee we have discussed down through the years the question as to whether or not we should have a smaller number. We've never done it. In other words, as far as time is concerned, or as far as the numbers, we have 60 members on the Appropriations Committee.

If we brought our 13 subcommittees down to five or six, it wouldn't work. It would take longer on the bills. We'd have to change our committee room, for one thing. We wouldn't have the seating. We'd have to change our committee room. It would take much longer to hold the hearings and it wouldn't work.

At one time, we temporarily put two or three subcommittees together and it did not work. We changed it back down through the years some 25 or 30 years ago. The system that we're using on the House side, I think, is the best system. We have 13 subcommittees, we have our 602(b) allocation, we have our hearings, we try to complete them by a certain time and I don't think that changing the subcommittee structure would help. It wouldn't help on the House side. It would be a complete disaster. I say that to you frankly.

Ms. DUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me come from another slant on the same question. Senator Byrd talked too about wishing that there were more debate time

for the Senate and he told us or told me personally in an interview I had with him that the Senate operates under one week off during the month and they are in town the rest of the time. Apparently it's not working very well because he said that when he picked up the phone to call a member on a Monday or Friday, usually they were home in their districts, which is, of course, half of our responsibility, to be back talking to our members, to our constituents.

I'm wondering if you think that if the House of Representatives began that same system where members would have one week off a month to go home, be in their districts, and focus on issues—for those of us on the West Coast, it would be easier obviously. If that could work in tandem with the Senate system and if we actually could come back here, hold sessions Monday through Friday, spread our incredible workload out over five days, do you think that could work as a new system of timing that would let us be more effective here?

Mr. NATCHER. Yes, I do. I think if you worked it right as to the timing in the House and in the Senate, it would be a better system than the one we have now. My friend, Dave Obey who sits on this committee, will tell you that time after time after time we have quorum calls, a waste of time, an absolute waste of time, things like that. I think that could be corrected. As far as the time element is concerned, knowing when roll call votes will be held, when the House and Senate would be in session, setting the time where you could be back in your State, back in your district, a better system than the one we have now, I'd be in favor of.

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Obey?

Mr. OBEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for being late. As you know, we've been in the middle of a Democratic caucus.

Mr. Chairman, I simply want to say that I think you have an excellent statement here and I think if you look on page four of your statement, I think you've really gone to the heart of the matter. I know there's tremendous frustration in this place about the fact that the authorization process many times has broken down in the past few years and as a result, there have been many legislative items carried on appropriations bills.

I think you have correctly pointed out the major reason for that is because you often have had very deep policy differences between the authorization committees and the administration. In effect, the administration often stiffed the authorization committees betting that they could get a better deal if they simply had to deal with appropriations. You've correctly pointed out that problem is likely to be behind us now with the end of gridlock.

I think you've also made some good suggestions about how we can stretch the room between the appropriations process and the authorization process by suggesting the possibility of two-year authorizations.

I'd like to just ask a rhetorical question here if I could, Mr. Chairman. With all of this discussion about the need for line item veto, I would ask people if they can tell me what is the most that any Congress since 1948 has ever changed any President's budget?

The answer is 3 percent. I think that 3 percent is the difference between having a President and having a king. So I make no apology for the fact that Congress through the years, regardless of which President has run the show, has changed the humongous total of 3 percent of the President's budget.

I also frankly am quite mystified when the item veto suggestion is raised and it is only suggested that it apply to appropriation bills. There is a lot of talk about enhanced rescissions. It would certainly seem to me that if we are to consider any of those, that those enhanced rescissions ought to apply as well to every tax expenditure and to every entitlement gimmick as well so that the President has the ability to review those with just as much detail as he does items that are produced through the appropriations process for discretionary spending.

Mr. Chairman, I would assume that you would agree that if something such as an enhanced rescission proposition is considered at all, that it ought to include those other categories as well?

Mr. NATCHER. I agree with you, Mr. Obey.

Mr. OBEY. Just one last question. When this is done and it raises the issue of being on one week and off one week, it's been my observation that we almost have that process now in the House. If you take a look at our schedule, we had a week in January where we were off the 11th to the 19th. In February, we had the 8th through the 15th. We won't have it in March except for four days. We will have more than a week when we're not in Washington during April and again in May.

It seems to me that the problem isn't so much that we need three weeks on in Washington and one week back in the districts; it's that we need to extend the work week when we are in Washington. I don't know if you have any specific suggestions other than political will for assuring that members are going to be in town here five days a week.

Another suggestion has been raised for instance to try to time it so that if we are not in session on a Friday, that you also not be in session that following Monday, so that you would have a long weekend but then the following weekend, understand that you're going to be here that Friday and that Monday. So at least you're picking up two working days every two weeks here rather than the Tuesday through Thursday business which plagues us now.

Do you have any figures as to the number of times the Appropriations Committee holds hearings on Mondays and Fridays?

Mr. NATCHER. In the past, Mr. Obey, as you and I know, on Mondays and Fridays, we have not held hearings. We don't have a budget this year. We are in the process of preparing a budget that will come up on April 5th. We've been holding hearings now on some of our subcommittees on Friday morning. In fact, the one that you and I are on, the one you and I believe in and really love, we're holding hearings on Friday morning. So far we have not held any hearings during the day on Monday.

In the past, Mondays and Fridays, we dropped out. Tuesday through Thursday, hearings are held in the morning, in the afternoon, and a lot of times at night.

Mr. OBEY. It would just seem to me that illustrates this is not just a problem in getting our work done. I think it's also a problem

in the public understanding what it is we're doing because you have seven and eight committees having major hearings on the same day if they're crammed Tuesday through Thursday. If we were to constructively use Monday and Friday, you would have more public attention, more press attention paid to some of the other hearings around here that are important but can't be covered because they are all being held pretty much on the same three-day week schedule. I think it might help to some small degree in the public understanding what it is we're wrestling with here.

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Obey, another matter that you and I are confronted with every year, we have authorizing committees that come out in the House chamber and they'll bring out a bill and take 13 or 14 days. You have that on Armed Services, 13 and 14 days. We bring out our appropriation bill, pass it one day and the record now on passing an appropriation bill, I had it for a while until Defense Subcommittee now has the record as far as time is concerned. I think John Murtha brought one out in 1 hour and 20 minutes. So 13 and 14 days on authorizing committees bringing out hundreds and hundreds of amendments is too many. That's one matter that could be corrected and it would really help us on the House side.

Mr. NATCHER. Our defense, as you know, Mr. Obey, we bring out the appropriations bill and pass it the same day, as I said, on one occasion, in less than two hours.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I think it's just useful to remind ourselves as Senator Domenici has pointed out, there is one great advantage to the appropriations structure in that you have precisely the same jurisdictions between subcommittees in the Senate and the House. If that could be replicated in the authorization, we'd all be a lot better off.

Senator BOREN. Thank you, Mr. Obey.

I believe Mr. Dreier has one follow-up question, if you will.

Mr. DREIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to take advantage of your extraordinary expertise and perspective on an issue you raised in your testimony. You referred to the fact that members of your committee are not allowed to serve on another committee. By virtue of that, they have become expert in their areas.

There are 299 committees today in the Congress and Senator Byrd, when he testified before us, referred to the fact that there is fractured attention by members because of the tremendous number of assignments.

I wondered what your thoughts are about following this model which is on your committee and the committee I serve on, the Committee on Rules, and the Ways and Means Committee, of not being able to serve on another committee if you have one major committee. Do you think we should do that as we look at those in the authorization process?

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Dreier, I think it would be good to take a look at it. I think it would be good to take a look and see if it would work. We have temporary assignments on the House side on committees, we have them serving on two or three committees. I don't believe, Mr. Dreier, that you can be a good member of Congress serving on too many committees and not spending enough time on

the one that you should serve on. I do think it would be good to take a look at it.

Mr. DREIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Any further questions? Mr. Reid?

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, I do have a question.

Two things I want to talk about. One is I ran out of time and I wanted the opportunity to compliment you on talking about the need to have sunset legislation. The reason I was late here is on the Senate side, the Government Operations Committee is today holding hearings on reorganization of government and I talked specifically about a sunset bill that I introduced that I think is in keeping with your thoughts.

Also, I'd like to tell you that I think you're right on line when you complain about the way we handle entitlements. It's just simply not the way to do business properly. It would be a very tough vote every year for us to vote on some of those entitlements, but that's what we should do, not have these expenditures that are just going right through the ceiling.

Thank you very much for your talk about sunset legislation and also the entitlement talk.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, we'll probably submit some written questions to you, if we may, and hope you and your staff can respond to those.

Mr. NATCHER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of your committee for permitting me to appear. Any questions you submit, I'm going to give you good answers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

REP. JENNIFER DUNN'S OPENING STATEMENT Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress March 11, 1993

Thank you, Mr. Chairman...and thank you, Chairman Natcher, for coming to testify this morning.

I think it is fair for me to say on behalf of my freshman colleagues in the House that today this Committee is tackling perhaps the biggest procedural problem that confronts us: the apparent redundancy of the authorization and appropriation processes.

One of the things this committee was created to address is the lack of public understanding of what it is Congress does. As a newcomer to this institution, I can tell you that the taxpayers of America by and large are thoroughly confused by the dual tracks of authorization and appropriation. They read press releases saying Congress has endorsed a program, then a month later they read that Congress has voted to kill funding for the same program. It is confusing even to those of us who now must live with it.

This morning, Chairman Natcher, sheds valuable light on the appropriations process. I intend to hear and consider his point of view. At the same time, I want to serve notice that I hope this Committee will do something bold in this area.

That is not necessarily to say that I am ready yet to endorse a full collapsing of the authorization and appropriations processes into a single step. But, in all honesty, I must admit that the idea is very tempting -- precisely because it accomplishes so many things:

- 1) It makes it possible for the public to understand the process;
- 2) It seems to me that it would move us a long way toward

3-11-93
Opening Statement of Rep. Dunn
Joint Committee

reducing the number of committee assignments around here;

3) It would give rise to more policy discussion and fewer line-item negotiations; and

4) It would force the authorizing committees to pay greater heed to budgetary realities and constraints.

Nonetheless, I realize that Chairman Natcher -- like Sen. Byrd before him -- has some relevant points regarding the track record of the appropriators under the current procedures. Those points must be given serious consideration; and, in whatever this committee ultimately proposes, we must be politically realistic.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would simply close by again thanking our witness for joining us this morning, and thanking the leadership of this committee for what promises to be a very healthy give-and-take on one of the most important issues we will consider this year.

HONORABLE WILLIAM H. NATCHER, CHAIRMAN
 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
 BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE
 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
 THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1993

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Joint Committee, which has been given a very important and very difficult job to do.

As you consider the budget process, I want to quickly review the annual appropriations process--what it does, and what it doesn't do.

APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS COVERS ONLY ONE-HALF OF ALL SPENDING

First off, many people don't know that only about one-half of all Federal spending goes through the annual appropriations process. The remainder is mandatory or entitlement spending and interest on the debt. And even though one-half of all spending is appropriated-- only 35% of the total is truly discretionary. The other 15% that is appropriated consists of appropriated entitlements that we cannot easily adjust without changing the authorizing legislation.

For instance, we appropriate funds every year for unemployment compensation, supplemental security income, veterans compensation and pensions, and the like which are entitlements for all practical purposes.

But even though discretionary spending is only 35% of the total budget--it is an extremely important part of the budget.

Our discretionary budget pays for:

- our domestic investments in areas such as health, education, transportation, science, urban and rural development, crime prevention, and natural resources;
- all of our national defense;
- nearly all Federal administrative expenses;
- all Federal housing programs;
- all foreign aid;
- all national park and recreation programs;
- all Federal research and development;
- and a host of other critical activities. .

APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS WORKS WELL

Mr. Chairman, for these discretionary programs to operate, appropriations must be enacted each year. This annual review is critical for both controlling spending and holding the Executive Branch accountable for these programs.

This also requires our Committee and the Congress to produce. And I am proud to say that we have produced. Year after year, our appropriations bills generally have been enacted on time and, when totalled up each year, are usually under budget.

APPROPRIATIONS BILLS HAVE BEEN UNDER BUDGET

In fact, the record shows that the annual appropriations process is the best process we have to control spending. The record has been consistently good, whether there were budget resolutions to set overall ceilings or there were not.

In the 18 years since the Budget Act was enacted in 1974, Congress appropriated a total of \$72 billion less than requested by the Presidents. In the 18 years preceding the budget resolution--from 1957 through 1974--Congress appropriated \$85 billion less than Presidential requests. Since 1945, we have appropriated over \$200 billion less than requested.

Last year was no exception to this excellent record. The total of FY 1993 appropriations bills was \$9.2 billion UNDER President Bush's request for discretionary spending. This included reductions in all three budget categories:

- \$2.0 billion in domestic spending;
- \$6.4 billion in military spending;
- \$800 million in international spending.

That's an excellent record which Congress has not matched for the mandatory spending side of the budget that is, in effect, on autopilot.

APPROPRIATED VERSUS BACKDOOR SPENDING

Mr. Chairman, every Member of your Joint Committee concerned with the budget should also know these statistics. The CBO tells us that over the last 12 years between 1980 and 1992, appropriated discretionary spending, including defense spending, grew by only 4.8% per year. This compares to an increase of 7.0% per year for mandatory spending after you exclude savings and loan costs and net interest payments. (If you included S&L spending and net interest, the rate of increase would be even higher.)

That is an impressive record, Mr. Chairman, and it shouldn't be forgotten when the budget process is being considered.

APPROPRIATIONS BILLS HAVE BEEN ON TIME

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Appropriations also works very hard so that we can finish our job on time. We have not needed a broad, long term Continuing Resolution since 1987. And that Continuing Resolution was part of a Budget Summit deal where it was agreed that one appropriations bill and one reconciliation bill would be presented to the President simultaneously.

Since then, limited short term continuing resolutions have been needed from time to time, but we usually have ended up enacting all 13 annual appropriations bills very close to the beginning of the fiscal year--October 1.

REASONS FOR SUCCESSFUL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS

I believe there are three main reasons why the appropriations process has been effective.

First is the requirement that Appropriations Committee Members cannot serve on any other standing committee. This enables our Members to devote the time it takes to become experts in their areas and to have the knowledge to make tough choices.

The second reason is the wide perspective Appropriations Committee Members must have. Our subcommittees are structured so that many different interests must compete for limited dollars in ways they don't have to do in the authorizing process.

A third reason is the heavy emphasis on budget totals and fiscal policy that is required in the appropriations process because of the unified budget. We are very conscious of our totals and spend a great deal of time adjusting and refining our bills to make things fit.

DUAL AUTHORIZING - APPROPRIATIONS STRUCTURE

Mr. Chairman, I believe the dual authorizing-appropriations structure that has been in place for many years sets up a pretty good balance between the emphasis on detailed program knowledge and advocacy that exists in the authorizing committees and the emphasis on program knowledge and fiscal control in the Appropriations Committee. Authorizing committees push their programs and the Appropriations Committee makes the necessary tough choices between competing needs. It's a good basic structure. Both perspectives are needed.

There is a different result, however, when these two perspectives are combined in one place. In almost every instance where these two functions have been combined, program advocacy wins out over budget control. The proof of this is our mandatory spending budget which has not been controlled as well as it should.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, this Joint Committee would make a significant contribution towards better budget control if it recommended tighter rules and procedures designed to shift more mandatory spending to the discretionary spending category so that these funds are reviewed from two different perspectives.

BALANCE OF POWER CONSIDERATION

Mr. Chairman, the appropriations process is important from another perspective as well. It affords every Member of Congress--through actions in the bills, language in the reports, and colloquies on the Floor--a very effective way to participate in the implementation of policies, programs and priorities of nearly every agency of Government each and every year.

It is important to the Legislative Branch and our constitutional form of government that we have this opportunity to exercise this type of review and oversight each year.

LEGISLATION ON APPROPRIATIONS BILLS

The appropriations process is not without its problems. We suffer from too many non-germane and legislative amendments to appropriations bills--especially amendments added on the Floor of the Senate.

I think, however, this will prove to be a problem of the past. A major reason for legislative amendments on appropriations bills has been the fact that the Presidents and Congress could not get together and agree on a host of issues that were addressed in many different authorizing bills over the last 12 years. With only a few exceptions, there has been deadlock between our authorizing committees and the Presidents.

You can go down the list -- crime, energy, health, science, banking, education, urban development, environment -- all have been slowed up or stopped cold. This impasse sometimes results in our friends on the authorizing committees asking the Appropriations Committee to include legislation in our must-pass appropriations bills.

Mr. Chairman, the American people want this legislative gridlock to end. And it is going to end, along with much of the frustration of the authorizing committees. Mr. Chairman, I believe our authorizing committees are going to be re-energized this year, and the problem of legislating in appropriations bills will be greatly diminished. And this is all to the good.

MULTI-YEAR AUTHORIZATIONS

If we combined this new attitude with procedural changes to require that multi-year authorizations be enacted prior to the budget year, it would serve the Congress and the public well.

This would strengthen the authorizing process by getting many of our authorizing committees back in the driver's seat since a framework would be in place before the start of the fiscal year against which the President and the Appropriations Committee could make budget decisions.

A way to go about this might be to require through an iron-clad rule that all funding authorizations be in place prior to the budget year and be for a minimum of two years -- with no exceptions.

This would have the advantage of having the President submit a budget based on enacted authorizations. It would also enable the legislative committees to submit views and estimates to the Budget Committee based on existing legislation rather than proposed legislation.

This could be enhanced further by enacting a permanent generic funding authorization for all authorized programs which deems the authorized level to be the last dollar amount enacted into law -- even if the funding authorization for a program has expired. Such a permanent generic authorization would give an added incentive to the authorization committees to complete their work, since this permanent authorization ceiling would become tighter and tighter as time goes by. It would also allow the Appropriations Committee to move without going to the Rules Committee as often.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the part of the budget that works is the appropriations process. And while things can always be improved, Congress should be extremely careful in changing the one process that has a proven track record in living within tight budget totals and making tough budget decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to work with this Committee in any way that I can to help you successfully complete your important task.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

HONORABLE WILLIAM H. NATCHER, CHAIRMAN

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

Question #1:

Mr. Chairman, you touched on the issue of legislation on appropriations bills in response to the questions of several Members of the Committee this morning. Would you elaborate on the different types of matters that Rule XXI prevents from being included in appropriations bills, what the new procedure entails under Caucus Rule 38, and whether you believe this problem will be significantly diminished in the years ahead?

RESPONSE:

It is my view that legislative committees should legislate and the appropriations committee should appropriate. That is what these committees do best. I would favor tougher rules that would enforce these responsibilities -- including prohibitions against the creation of new back door spending programs that bypass the appropriations process and rules to encourage the shifting of certain existing mandatory spending to the discretionary category.

As Chairman of the Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Subcommittee, I resisted attempts to attach legislative matters to our bill, including many attempts from Members of authorizing committees.

As Chairman of the full Appropriations Committee, it will be my policy to continue to discourage legislation on appropriations bills.

Rule XXI. There are two main categories of legislative matters which Rule XXI prevents from being added to appropriations bills:

- (1) appropriations for unauthorized programs (in almost all cases, these appropriations are for programs whose most recent authorization has expired), and
- (2) legislative provisions that change existing law.

Expired Authorizations. Rule XXI of the House prohibits the appropriation "for any expenditure not previously authorized by law." Unfortunately, there are many Departments and agencies whose authorizations have expired and for which reauthorization bills have not been enacted. For instance, for FY 1993,

authorizations were not in place for such agencies as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Customs Service, the FCC, the Bureau of the Mint, Amtrak, the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, NASA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, nearly all of the Department of Energy, Legal Services Corporation, International Financial Institutions, or the Agency for International Development at the time we had to move FY 1993 appropriations bills in the House.

Last year, 11 of our 13 appropriations subcommittees had agencies within their various jurisdictions for which authorizations expired at the time they marked up their bills.

Under the rules of the House, unauthorized appropriations cannot be included in our bills without passage of a resolution reported by the Committee on Rules waiving Clause 2 of Rule XXI for this purpose. It has been the practice of the House Rules Committee to refrain from providing such waivers if opposed by the chairman of the affected authorizing committee. Under this practice, we assume that nearly all Clause 2, Rule XXI waivers granted to appropriations bills for this purpose have been agreed to by the authorizing chairmen.

The large extent to which major ongoing programs are unauthorized puts our Committee in a difficult position. On the one hand, the public would not stand for Congress shutting down the Justice Department or the Customs Service. On the other, the authorizing committees sometime resent the Appropriations Committee for continuing the funding of expired agencies or programs because they feel this causes their committees to be bypassed -- taking away the incentive of the Executive Branch to negotiate a new authorization bill.

Our Committee sympathizes with this problem. From time to time, our House Subcommittees on Appropriations have tried to spur authorizing action by not funding entire unauthorized agencies and programs in a House appropriations bill.

Unfortunately, this has not worked. The Senate ends up funding these unauthorized activities in its appropriations bill with the added advantage to the Senate of going to conference with a bill that fully reflects the funding priorities of that body compared to nothing for the House.

Not having authorizations in place at the start of the budget year disenfranchises the authorizing committees in many important budget decisions. Lack of an enacted authorization hinders an authorizing committee from having a meaningful role in shaping the President's Budget and the Congressional Budget Resolution as well as the funding levels in appropriations bills.

For a more detailed explanation of the extent of this problem, I recommend to you the January 15, 1993, report to Congress entitled "Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations" by the Congressional Budget Office. That report found that a total of 74 authorizing laws totaling nearly \$300 billion expired before FY 1993.

UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPIRING AUTHORIZATIONS

TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZATIONS OF
APPROPRIATIONS EXPIRING BEFORE FISCAL YEAR
1993, BY HOUSE AUTHORIZING COMMITTEE
(In thousands of dollars)

House Committee	Number of Laws	Authorization Amounts ^a
Agriculture	2	2,000
Armed Services	4	265,820,039
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs	2	55,208
Education and Labor	16	2,898,275
Energy and Commerce	17	417,100
Foreign Affairs	4	6,817,471
Government Operations	1	10,000
House Administration	1	1,120
Interior and Insular Affairs	8	107,000
Judiciary	3	8,292
Merchant Marine and Fisheries	11	677,627
Post Office and Civil Service	2	300
Public Works and Transportation	3	66,800
Science, Space, and Technology	7	20,220,377
Select Committee on Intelligence	1	285,800
Small Business	1	8,000
Veterans' Affairs	3	55,000
Ways and Means	<u>2</u>	<u>5,000</u>
Total	74 ^b	296,781,415 ^b

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

- a. Amounts do not include indefinite authorizations.
b. The totals are less than the sum of the entries because authorizations under the jurisdiction of more than one committee are counted only once in the total.

UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPIRING AUTHORIZATIONS

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZATIONS OF
APPROPRIATIONS EXPIRING BEFORE FISCAL YEAR
1993, BY SENATE AUTHORIZING COMMITTEE
(In thousands of dollars)

Senate Committee	Number of Laws	Authorization Amounts ^a
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry	2	2,000
Armed Services	2	265,532,739
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs	1	54,208
Commerce, Science, and Transportation	15	20,677,260
Energy and Natural Resources	5	72,000
Environment and Public Works	5	69,000
Finance	2	6,000
Foreign Relations	4	6,817,471
Governmental Affairs	3	10,300
Judiciary	3	8,292
Labor and Human Resources	29	3,176,475
Rules and Administration	1	1,120
Select Committee on Indian Affairs	3	5,750
Select Committee on Intelligence	1	285,800
Small Business	1	8,000
Veterans' Affairs	3	55,000
Total	74 ^b	296,781,415 ^b

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

- a. Amounts do not include indefinite authorizations.
 b. The totals are less than the sum of the entries because authorizations under the jurisdiction of more than one committee are counted only once in the total.

Changes in Existing Law. The other major category of Rule XXI matters are provisions attached to appropriations bills that change existing law.

These items can be classified into essentially two categories. Many technical legislative provisions are routinely carried in our bills to facilitate the orderly administration of the Government. These provisions include such items as clarifying the availability of funds; prohibiting the use of funds for lobbying activities or publicity purposes; technical definitions of programs, projects, and activities; financial apportionment procedures; travel allowances; personnel ceilings; real property lease procedures; office space rental restrictions; absorption of pay costs; and many other similar items.

These technical provisions make up the bulk of the legislative items in appropriations bills and, for the most part, have been considered routine and non-controversial.

Appropriations bills also carry more substantive legislative items from time to time which have been the focal point of controversy. Several points should be kept in mind about these items.

In the House, such matters cannot be attached to our bills without passage of a resolution reported by the Committee on Rules waiving Clause 2 of Rule XXI for this purpose. It has been the practice of the House Rules Committee to refrain from providing such waivers if opposed by the chairman of the affected authorizing committee. Under this practice, we assume that nearly all Clause 2, Rule XXI waivers granted to appropriations bills have been agreed to by the authorizing chairmen.

I believe the Senate Appropriations Committee has also had a good record in working with its authorizing committees when reporting appropriations bills to the Senate.

The weak point in the process is on the Senate floor -- where it has become practice to sometimes vote to waive rules on germaneness or rules prohibiting legislation on appropriations bills in order to add substantive legislative provisions.

Many of the legislative issues attached to appropriations bills are politically powerful. Once these issues are joined, it becomes difficult for House and Senate appropriators to drop them for purely jurisdictional reasons. In fact, many of these legislative items are supported by chairmen of authorizing committees.

Caucus Rule 38. Rule 38 was added to the Caucus Rules this year in an effort to give authorizing committees more timely notice of issues in appropriations bills that affect their jurisdiction. The purpose of this is to ensure that authorizing committees are given as much time as possible to formulate their views and make them known to our Committee.

This rule reads as follows:

Rule 38. Notice of Appropriations Violations

- A. It shall be the policy of the Caucus that when the Committee on Appropriations orders reported any general appropriation bill which includes any provision in violation of clauses 2 or 6 of House Rule XXI and within the jurisdiction of a standing committee, it shall give notice immediately to the chairman of the standing committee which has jurisdiction over such provision of the specific provisions in violation of clauses 2 or 6 of House Rule XXI; provided further, that when any other committee of the House orders reported any bill, resolution or amendment thereto carrying an appropriation from a committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations in violation of clause 5 of House Rule XXI, such committee shall give notice immediately to the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.
- B. It shall be the responsibility of the Committee on Appropriations to deliver copies of House-passed appropriation bills with numbered Senate amendments to the chairman of the appropriate authorizing committees at least 24 hours prior to requesting appointment of conferees thereon unless the Speaker determines otherwise.

It shall be the responsibility of the Committee on Appropriations upon filing of a conference report on an appropriations measure to deliver copies of the conference report and joint statement of the managers to the chairman of the appropriate authorizing committees at least 24 hours prior to floor action thereon unless the Speaker determines otherwise.

It is the expectation of the leadership and representatives of the authorizing committee chairmen that this new procedure will help to discourage attaching these legislative matters to appropriations bills. I fully support this rule and have directed the staff to ensure it is followed.

Future Relationship Between Appropriations and Authorizing Committees. I am fully committed to improving the relationship between our committee and the House authorizing committees.

As I said in my oral testimony, I believe that the strained relationship that has sometimes existed between our committees is really the result of, not the cause of, the frustration that many authorizing committee members feel because of their inability to move legislation over the last 12 years. .

Much of this frustration should dissipate of its own accord with the election of our new President and his desire to address these legislative matters through the authorization process.

I believe the notice requirement in Caucus Rule 38 will further help to dissolve this problem and improve our relationship with various authorizing committees.

New Multi-Year Authorization Requirement. I also believe that the authorizing process could be greatly strengthened by enacting procedural changes to require that multi-year authorizations be enacted prior to the budget year (i.e., the year before the fiscal year). This would give the authorizing committees a stronger voice in budget decisions and give them more time for program oversight activities. I believe there is a great need to strengthen the program oversight activities of our authorizing committees. Such a requirement also would serve to better define and distinguish the authorizing and appropriations roles in Congress and in the eyes of the public.

Because this new rule would be difficult to enforce, I would suggest enacting a companion provision that creates a permanent generic funding authorization for all authorized programs which deems the authorized level for any program that has an expired authorization to be the last dollar amount enacted into law for that program. Such a permanent generic authorization would give an added incentive to the authorizing committees to complete their work, since this permanent ceiling would become tighter and tighter as time goes by.

QUESTION #2:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens discussed with you certain cases in which he believed it was appropriate to proceed with appropriations actions prior to enactment of an authorization. Do you agree with him? If so, what types of activities fit in this category and why?

RESPONSE:

I am committed to minimizing the instances of legislation on appropriations bills.

There are situations, however, when legislation on appropriations bills is justified. The most common case is the instance when reauthorization bills are not passed and the authorizations for vital agencies and programs expire. It is not responsible in this case to terminate activities that are vital to our country's health or welfare.

There are other cases in times of natural disasters, military action, or economic emergency when quick appropriations action is warranted if authorization legislation cannot be enacted promptly.

There are also technical matters that need to be continued each year in appropriations bills to facilitate good fiscal management and to clarify fine points of law. We would welcome authorizing committee action to codify such provisions thereby removing the need to carry these items annually in our bills.

I believe, however, there have been too many instances of attaching substantive legislation to appropriations acts. Oftentimes, such provisions are widely supported, and it becomes too tempting for Members who feel strongly about a particular issue to attach such items to "must pass" appropriations measures instead of including them in controversial authorizing bills that rarely are enacted.

Over the years, nearly every authorization chairman of both bodies has supported attaching various legislative items to appropriations bills. For instance, in 1984, a major Omnibus Crime bill, a Foreign Aid authorization bill, and a Public Works authorization bill were all attached to the continuing resolution on the floor of the House pursuant to motions of Members or chairmen of the relevant authorizing committees.

I agree with those who argue that the convenience and effectiveness of attaching these items to appropriations bills must be resisted in order to strengthen and revitalize our authorizing committees.

QUESTION #3:

Mr. Chairman, there was considerable discussion during your testimony about proposals to sunset entitlement authorizing legislation. What possible proposals should be considered?

RESPONSE:

The single most important budget reform that could be made would be to change the way Congress and the President review and approve mandatory spending programs. These programs are essentially on autopilot with only haphazard and spotty control being applied through the reconciliation process.

The record shows that Congress has done a much better job in controlling discretionary expenditures through the annual appropriations process than it has in controlling mandatory expenditures that need to be authorized only once, with no annual review through the appropriations process.

According to the CBO, over the last 12 years between 1980 and 1992, appropriated discretionary spending, including defense spending, grew by 4.8 percent per year. The domestic discretionary part of the budget grew by only 4.3 percent per year during this period. This compares to an increase of 7.0 percent per year for mandatory spending after you exclude savings and loan costs and net interest payments. (If you included S&L spending and net interest, the annual rate of increase would be 7.4 percent.) During this same period, revenue grew by 5.7 percent per year and inflation grew by 4.3 percent per year.

This problem is made worse by the long-term trend in which more and more federal budget expenditures are being placed on autopilot by requiring that payments be made mandatory. The CBO reports that, in 1962, 70 percent of all federal outlays were discretionary. In 1992, the figure has dropped to 35 percent. That is the wrong direction.

Automatic Sunset Provision. To reverse this trend, your Committee should consider recommending the enactment of a permanent provision in the Budget Act requiring that all existing mandatory spending programs except social security and other retirement programs be automatically "sunsetting" and reauthorized every four or five years so that the spending rates in these programs are visible and regularly reviewed. I would suggest enacting a staggered "sunset" schedule so that a certain number of major reauthorizations would be up for renewal every year. In this way, the President, Congress, and the American public would be forced to examine on a regular basis whether we can afford the benefits of these programs in light of our overall fiscal situation.

As an incentive for both the Congress and the President to enact reauthorization bills, I would also suggest a permanent provision in the Budget Act requiring an automatic freeze of benefits (no COLA's, etc.) or some sort of modified freeze (e.g., one-half the normal benefit increases) for any entitlement program that expires until such time as it is reauthorized.

I would also favor amending the Budget Act to set tougher legislated standards for the creation of new mandatory programs. We should enact statutory procedures that absolutely prohibit any new mandatory spending program unless it finances an insurance or retirement program or provides for payments that are Constitutionally required. Any other type of new program ought to be discretionary and should compete against all other spending priorities.

We should also enact tougher standards for existing entitlements so that some are reconverted to discretionary programs when they are reauthorized according to the automatic sunset process.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD FROM HON. ROBERT S. WALKER

Question #1:

Mr. Chairman, on page 4 of your testimony you say that the appropriations process "affords every Member of Congress...a very effective way to participate" in programmatic funding decisions. Frankly, with over 85% of the House membership not on the Appropriations Committee and the text of your bills kept secret until just hours before floor consideration as a matter of practice, how can this be so? To many in the House, the very opposite is the case.

RESPONSE:

I don't believe the facts support the premise that our bills are kept secret until floor consideration. The record of how we develop our bills clearly shows that all Members are given the opportunity to participate in the appropriations process -- both on the floor and through the hearing process.

Every year our 13 subcommittees hold extensive hearings covering virtually every agency in the Federal Government. As part of this process, each subcommittee takes testimony and input from a large number of Members. For example, last year, my Subcommittee on Labor, HHS, and Education took testimony from 160 Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle and received a total of 765 letters on different issues from virtually every Member of Congress.

As another example, our Energy and Water Development Subcommittee took testimony from 155 Members and received 249 letters from Members. Again, these Members were on both sides of the aisle.

Concerning the availability of our reported bills, it is the practice of the Committee to make available "committee prints" of all bills and reports (including bill changes adopted by the full Committee) to any Member and to the general public immediately after each bill is reported by the full Committee in room H-218 Capitol. In addition, we give notice immediately after a bill is reported to the chairman of any standing committee which has jurisdiction over any provision in our bills that may be a violation of clauses 2 or 6 of House Rule XXI in accordance with Democratic Caucus Rules.

Last year, all 13 of our regular appropriations bills and accompanying reports were available at least 3 legislative days prior to their consideration on the Floor. Following is a table showing availability:

Availability of Bill/Report
Prior to House Floor Action

FY 1993 <u>Appropriations Bills</u>	<u>Calendar</u>	<u>Legislative</u>
	<u>Days</u>	<u>Days</u>
Agriculture	5	3
Commerce, Justice, State	7	5
Defense	3	3
District of Columbia	7	3
Energy and Water Development ..	6	4
Foreign Operations	7	5
Interior	22	10
Labor, HHS, Education	5	3
Legislative	6	4
Military Construction	5	3
Transportation	8	4
Treasury, Postal Service	6	4
VA, HUD, Independent Agencies	6	4

In addition, nearly all of our bills are considered under an open rule or under no rule at all. All proper amendments, especially amendments to cut, are usually in order when our bills are considered in the House.

The availability of our bills and the manner in which they are considered on the House floor I believe overwhelmingly demonstrates that every Member of Congress has an effective way to participate in funding decisions.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

During my testimony, Chairman Hamilton also asked me to provide for the record more details on the mandatory spending programs that might be reconverted to discretionary status.

RESPONSE:

As a general rule, I would advocate the review of all mandatory programs for possible conversion to discretionary status except those that provide: (1) insurance-type payments to individuals (e.g. social security, Medicare, unemployment); (2) retirement benefits; (3) payments for certain legal settlements; or (4) salaries of the President and the Judiciary Branch.

Many of the rest ought to be reclassified as discretionary and should compete with all other spending.

For example, mandatory programs that might be reclassified include such accounts as:

- Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Conservation Reserve program, and Dairy Indemnity program;
- CCC Export Loan Program loan subsidies;
- Food Stamp program;
- CCC Reimbursement for net realized losses.
- Child Care block grant;
- Foster Care;
- Title XX Social Services block grant;
- Aid to Families and Dependent Children;
- Pell Grants;
- Rehabilitation State grants;
- Reclamation Trust Fund;
- Reforestation Trust Fund;
- Sport Fish Restoration;
- Forest Service, Brush Disposal, Timber roads, Timber Salvage sales;

- Veterans Administration Housing Loan Guaranty program;
- Highway, mass transit, airport programs (clarification that obligational authority is discretionary budget authority controlled through annual obligation limitations);

to name a few.

There are many other programs that could be considered as well. For your reference is a more complete listing of all entitlement accounts that is compiled in the April 6, 1993, Congressional Research Service report entitled, "Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending."

Detailed Entitlement Account Listing

Table 5 presents a list of entitlement accounts. Specific account outlays have been *limited to general and trust fund accounts*. Summary outlays for special, public enterprise, and intragovernmental fund accounts are listed as "other mandatory" at the end of each budget function. This decision was made to limit the detailed list to what are usually thought of as entitlements, rather than other mandatory spending activities. The specific accounts listed in table 5 make up 97 percent of estimated 1993 entitlement and other mandatory spending. Major spending accounts not included in the table include public enterprise funds for farm income stabilization (primarily the CCC Fund), and certain insurance funds such as rural housing insurance, rural development insurance, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mutual mortgage and cooperative housing insurance, and FHA general and special risk insurance.

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
National defense		
17-9972-0-7-051	Department of the Navy trust funds	\$ 27,100
17-9981-0-8-051	Department of the Navy trust revolving funds	(500)
21-9971-0-7-051	Department of the Army trust funds	400
57-8928-0-7-051	Department of the Air Force general gift fund	200
57-9982-0-8-051	Department of the Air Force trust revolving funds	5,000
97-8164-0-8-051	Surcharge collections, sales of commissary stores, defense	41,700
97-8165-0-7-051	Foreign national employees separation pay	84,300
97-9993-0-1-051	Foreign nationals separation fund	86,733
56-3400-0-1-054	Payment to the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability fund	168,900
97-0040-0-1-054	Payment to military retirement fund	12,273,000
97-9990-8-7-054	Military retirement, Federal contribution	(12,273,000)
Other mandatory		21,544
Function total		435,377
International affairs		
11-9972-0-7-151	Peace Corps miscellaneous trust fund	1,449
12-2274-0-1-151	Expenses, Public Law 480, foreign assistance programs	(585,500)
69-9971-0-7-151	Miscellaneous trust funds	12,349
69-9971-0-7-151	Miscellaneous trust funds	1,061
72-9971-0-7-151	Miscellaneous trust funds, AID	5,000
11-1036-0-1-153	Payment to the foreign service retirement and disability fund	42,677
11-9990-8-7-153	Payment to the foreign service retirement fund	(42,677)
19-0540-0-1-153	Payment to the foreign service retirement and disability fund	119,082
19-0540-0-1-153	Payment to the foreign service retirement and disability fund	165,000
19-0601-0-1-153	Repatriation loans program account	0
19-9971-0-7-153	Miscellaneous trust funds	2,400
19-9990-8-7-153	Payment to foreign service retirement fund	(119,082)

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
19-9990-8-7-153	Payment to foreign service retirement fund	(\$165,000)
95-8268-0-7-153	Gifts and donations	75
67-9971-0-7-154	Miscellaneous trust funds	2,255
95-8272-0-7-154	Eastern europe student exchange endowment fund	31
11-8238-0-7-155	Kuwait civil reconstruction trust fund	10,390
11-8242-0-7-155	Foreign military sales trust fund	11,286,000
11-9990-8-7-155	Foreign military sales trust fund (receipts)	(11,201,653)
Other mandatory		(1,321,891)
Function total		(1,788,034)
General science, space, and technology		
49-8960-0-7-251	Donations	20,960
Function total		20,960
Energy		
12-3104-0-1-271	Rural economic development grants	0
89-8575-0-7-271	Advances for cooperative work	15,539
89-8882-0-1-271	Uranium enrichment corporation	0
89-9990-8-7-271	Energy-advances for cooperative work	(15,539)
89-0233-0-1-274	SPR petroleum account (emergency energy preparedness)	0
Other Mandatory		1,047,511
Function total		1,047,511
Natural resources and environment		
12-8210-0-7-301	Miscellaneous contributed funds (water resources)	1,260
14-0667-0-1-301	Loan program liquidating account	(652)
14-8070-0-7-301	Reclamation trust funds	49,624
96-8333-0-7-301	Coastal wetlands restoration trust fund	19,049
96-8862-0-7-301	Rivers and harbors contributed funds	166,828
12-1080-0-1-302	Wetlands reserve program	34,637
12-3319-0-1-302	Conservation reserve program	1,772,691
12-8028-0-7-302	Cooperative work trust fund	361,619
12-8046-0-7-302	Reforestation trust fund	30,561
12-8210-0-7-302	Miscellaneous contributed funds (conservation and land management)	100
14-9971-0-7-302	Miscellaneous trust funds	7,442
14-9971-0-7-302	Miscellaneous trust funds	1,601
14-8151-0-7-303	Sport fish restoration	191,081
14-8151-0-7-303	Sport fish restoration	8,738
14-8154-0-7-303	African elephant conservation fund	715
14-8216-0-7-303	Contributed funds	6,226
14-9972-0-7-303	Miscellaneous trust funds	7,773
95-8298-0-7-303	Donations	2
69-8312-0-7-304	Payment of claims	20,000

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account(Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
69-8313-0-7-304	Emergency fund	\$ 25,000
14-8287-0-7-306	Contributed funds	700
14-8562-0-7-306	Contributed funds	100
Other mandatory		441,735
Function total		3,146,830
Agriculture		
12-1140-0-1-351	Agricultural credit insurance program account	6,367
12-1336-0-1-351	Commodity credit corporation loans program account	504,000
12-1336-0-1-351	Commodity credit corporation loans program account	380,907
12-3314-0-1-351	Dairy indemnity program	100
12-3635-0-1-351	Emergency food assistance program	48,000
78-8202-0-7-351	Financial assistance corporation trust fund	126,051
12-0300-0-1-352	National agricultural library	100
12-1500-0-1-352	Cooperative State research service	2,850
12-1600-0-1-352	Salaries and expenses	10,825
12-8137-0-7-352	Expenses and refunds, inspection and grading of farm products	1,800
12-8203-0-7-352	Gifts and bequests	122
12-8214-0-7-352	Miscellaneous contributed funds	7,500
12-8218-0-7-352	Miscellaneous contributed funds	250
12-8227-0-7-352	Miscellaneous contributed funds	400
12-8232-0-7-352	Miscellaneous contributed funds	3,500
12-9971-0-7-352	Miscellaneous trust funds	7,084
12-9972-0-7-352	Miscellaneous trust funds	95,507
Other mandatory		16,099,255
Function total		17,294,618
Commerce		
12-2081-0-1-371	Rural housing insurance fund program account	10,215
18-1004-0-1-372	Payment to the postal service fund for nonfunded liability	38,614
13-1006-0-1-376	Salaries and expenses	0
13-8501-0-7-376	Gifts and bequests	208
13-8546-0-7-376	Information products and services	0
76-8095-0-7-376	Gifts and donations	100
Other mandatory		2,924,091
Function total		2,973,228
Transportation		
46-0300-0-1-401	Interest payments	56,664
69-0720-0-1-401	Amtrak corridor improvement loans liquidating account	(103)
69-1399-0-1-402	Aircraft purchase loan guarantee program	150
69-0241-0-1-403	Retired pay	461,520
69-0241-0-1-403	Retired pay	47,524

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
69-1751-0-1-403	Ocean freight differential	\$ 39,488
69-8503-0-7-403	Gifts and bequests	10
69-8533-0-7-403	Coast Guard general gift fund	80
69-8547-0-7-403	Special studies, services and projects	0
69-9981-0-8-403	Miscellaneous trust revolving funds	25
Other mandatory		(62,171)
Function total		543,187
Community and regional development		
42-0102-0-1-451	Public development	100,000
42-8112-0-7-451	Gifts and donations	0
58-8200-0-7-451	Gift and bequests, fire administration	0
86-8093-0-7-451	Gifts and bequests	5
12-2069-0-1-452	Rural development loan fund program account	267
12-2082-0-1-452	Rural development insurance fund program account	132
12-3104-0-1-452	Rural economic development grants	4,170
12-3104-0-1-452	Rural economic development grants	4,900
13-8509-0-7-452	Regional development commissions	0
14-2204-0-1-452	White earth settlement fund	12,000
14-8366-0-7-452	Cooperative fund (papago)	2,994
14-9973-0-7-452	Miscellaneous trust funds (area and regional development)	404,237
14-9973-0-7-452	Miscellaneous trust funds (area and regional development)	600
14-9973-0-7-452	Miscellaneous trust funds (area and regional development)	1,300
46-9971-0-7-452	Miscellaneous trust funds	4,564
11-8244-0-7-453	Bequests and gifts	180
Other mandatory		217,440
Function total		752,789
ETESS		
91-0400-0-1-501	Vocational and adult education	7,148
91-0230-0-1-502	Guaranteed student loans liquidating account	2,509,000
91-0231-0-1-502	Guaranteed student loan program account	2,288,500
91-0240-0-1-502	Higher education facilities loans	(2,843)
91-0242-0-1-502	College housing and academic facilities loans liquidating accounts	33,492
95-8281-0-7-502	Barry Goldwater scholarship and excellence in education foundation	3,118
95-8282-0-7-502	James Madison memorial fellowship trust fund	1,417
95-8296-0-7-502	Harry S Truman memorial scholarship trust fund	3,343
03-9971-0-7-503	Gift and trust fund accounts	12,796
33-8190-0-7-503	Canal Zone biological area fund	150
59-8040-0-7-503	Gifts and donations (arts)	100
59-8050-0-7-503	Gifts and donations (humanities)	100
59-8080-0-7-503	Gifts and donations	2

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account(Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
80-8978-0-7-503	Science, space, and technology education trust fund	\$ 1,300
16-0326-0-1-504	Federal unemployment benefits and allowances (training and employment)	77,000
16-8131-0-7-504	Gifts and bequests	450
75-1508-0-1-506	Interim assistance to States for legalization	372,000
75-1534-0-1-506	Social services block grant	2,772,000
75-1545-0-1-506	Payments to States for foster care and adoption assistance	2,610,000
91-0301-0-1-506	Rehabilitation services and disability research	1,852,378
91-0301-0-1-506	Rehabilitation services and disability research	298,917
95-8077-0-7-506	Gifts and donations	0
Other mandatory		(21,417)
Function total		12,818,951
Health		
20-0920-0-1-551	Health insurance supplement to earned income credit	506,000
20-8175-0-7-551	Vaccine improvement program trust fund	21,195
20-8175-0-7-551	Vaccine improvement program trust fund	2,585
24-0206-0-1-551	Government payment for annuitants, employees health benefits	3,730,000
24-8440-0-8-551	Employees health benefits fund	(33,000)
24-8445-0-8-551	Retired employees health benefits fund	(359)
75-0320-0-1-551	Vaccine injury compensation	110,000
75-0379-0-1-551	Retirement pay and medical benefits for commissioned officers	119,197
75-0379-0-1-551	Retirement pay and medical benefits for commissioned officers	21,565
75-0391-0-1-551	Indian health facilities	3,476
75-0512-0-1-551	Grants to States for medicaid	63,220,000
75-0512-0-1-551	Grants to States for medicaid	17,100,000
75-9971-0-7-551	Miscellaneous trust funds	46,660
97-8295-0-7-551	Coal miners' retiree health benefits trust fund	220,000
75-0340-0-1-552	Health professions graduate student loan insurance program	31,060
75-9911-0-1-554	Salaries and expenses	283
Other mandatory		19,679
Function total		85,118,341
Medicare		
20-8004-0-7-571	Federal supplementary medical insurance trust fund	56,379,000
20-8004-0-7-571	Federal supplementary medical insurance trust fund	23,445
20-8005-0-7-571	Federal hospital insurance trust fund	89,817,000
20-8005-0-7-571	Federal hospital insurance trust fund	175,729
20-9990-8-7-571	Federal contributions, FSMI Fund	(46,044,000)
20-9990-8-7-571	Federal contributions, FSMI Fund	(8,000)
75-0580-0-1-571	Payments to health care trust funds	46,044,000
75-0580-0-1-571	Payments to health care trust funds	8,000
Function total		146,395,174

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
Income security		
16-0327-0-1-601	Advances to the unemployment trust fund and other funds (general retirement and disability)	\$ 330,000
16-1521-0-1-601	Special benefits (general retirement and disability)	4,000
16-9971-0-7-601	Special workers' compensation expenses	114,009
20-8144-0-7-601	Black lung disability trust fund	934,468
20-8144-0-7-601	Black lung disability trust fund	56,532
20-9990-8-7-601	Offsetting receipt, advances to UI and other trust funds	(330,000)
20-9994-8-7-601	Railroad social security	(3,445,000)
20-9995-8-7-601	Interest payments on advances to railroad retirement	(250,800)
60-0111-0-1-601	Federal windfall subsidy	22,000
60-0113-0-1-601	Federal payments to the railroad retirement accounts	3,085,100
60-8010-0-7-601	Railroad social security equivalent benefit account	7,902,400
60-8011-0-7-601	Rail industry pension fund	2,806,200
60-8012-0-7-601	Supplemental annuity pension fund	99,600
60-9990-8-1-601	Repayment of advances, RR board	(2,914,500)
60-9990-8-7-601	Payment to railroad retirement	(3,021,100)
60-9992-8-7-601	Fed. pymt. to RR TF, rail industry pension	(64,300)
75-0409-0-1-601	Special benefits for disabled coal miners	580,800
75-0409-0-1-601	Special benefits for disabled coal miners	198,000
75-9991-8-7-601	Offsetting receipts	(375,000)
10-8110-0-7-602	Judicial survivors' annuities fund	6,118
10-8122-0-7-602	Judicial officers' retirement fund	5,037
10-8124-0-7-602	Claims court judges retirement fund	250
11-8345-0-7-602	Foreign service national separation liability trust fund	46
13-8344-0-7-602	Foreign service national separation liability trust fund	100
16-1521-0-1-602	Special benefits (Federal employee retirement and disability fund)	255,386
19-8186-0-7-602	Foreign service retirement and disability fund	411,898
19-8340-0-7-602	Foreign service national separation liability trust fund	7,000
23-8115-0-7-602	Tax court judges survivors annuity fund	170
24-0500-0-1-602	Government payment for annuitants, employee life insurance benefits	16,648
24-8135-0-7-602	Civil service retirement and disability fund	34,907,000
24-8135-0-7-602	Civil service retirement and disability fund	288,000
24-8424-0-8-602	Employees life insurance fund	(1,185,201)
67-8341-0-7-602	Foreign service national separation liability trust fund	2,036
72-8342-0-7-602	Foreign service national separation liability trust fund	306
97-8097-0-7-602	Military retirement fund	25,726,000
16-0326-0-1-603	Federal unemployment benefits and allowances (Unemployment compensation)	62,000
16-0327-0-1-603	Advances to the unemployment trust fund and other funds (Unemployment compensation)	6,629,226
20-8042-0-7-603	Unemployment trust fund (unemployment compensation)	96,000
20-8042-0-7-603	Unemployment trust fund (unemployment compensation)	26,988,700

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
20-8042-0-7-603	Unemployment trust fund (unemployment compensation)	\$ 325,000
20-8042-0-7-603	Unemployment trust fund (unemployment compensation)	5,988,000
20-8042-0-7-603	Unemployment trust fund (unemployment compensation)	224,000
20-9990-8-7-603	Unemployment trust fund, repayable advances	(7,472,226)
12-3502-0-1-605	Special milk program	19,400
12-3505-0-1-605	Food stamp program	23,130,000
12-3539-0-1-605	State child nutrition programs	6,422,000
12-3550-0-1-605	Nutrition assistance for Puerto Rico	1,039,737
20-0906-0-1-609	Payment where earned income credit exceeds liability for tax	8,477,000
75-0406-0-1-609	Supplemental security income program	15,123,000
75-0406-0-1-609	Supplemental security income program	5,240,000
75-1501-0-1-609	Family support payments to States	12,142,000
75-1501-0-1-609	Family support payments to States	4,000,000
75-1509-0-1-609	Payments to states for AFDC work programs	710,000
Other mandatory		(172,797)
Function total		175,144,243
Social security		
20-8006-0-7-651	Federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund	264,605,000
20-8006-0-7-651	Federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund	3,391,000
20-8006-0-7-651	Federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund	206,500
20-8007-0-7-651	Federal disability insurance trust fund	33,910,000
20-8007-0-7-651	Federal disability insurance trust fund	54,000
20-8007-0-7-651	Federal disability insurance trust fund	28,158
20-9990-8-7-651	FOASI, Fed. Pymt. to FOASI TF	(35,242)
20-9990-8-7-651	FOASI, Fed. Pymt. to FOASI TF	(28,000)
20-9990-8-7-651	FOASI, Fed. Pymt. to FOASI TF	(31,000)
75-0404-0-1-651	Payments to social security trust funds	35,242
75-0404-0-1-651	Payments to social security trust funds	31,000
75-0404-0-1-651	Payments to social security trust funds	5,495,000
75-9999-8-7-651	Receipts from taxes on benefits	(5,495,000)
Function total		302,166,658
Veterans benefits and services		
36-0102-0-1-701	Compensation and pensions	13,155,400
36-0102-0-1-701	Compensation and pensions	3,094,200
36-0102-0-1-701	Compensation and pensions	105,049
36-0120-0-1-701	Veterans insurance and indemnities	22,980
36-0200-0-1-701	Reinstated entitlement program for survivors	0
36-8132-0-7-701	National service life insurance fund	1,297,442
36-8150-0-7-701	United States government life insurance fund	25,210
36-8455-0-8-701	Veterans special life insurance fund	(33,990)
36-0137-0-1-702	Readjustment benefits	794,000

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993—Continued

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
36-8133-0-7-702	Post-Vietnam era veterans education account	\$ 94,500
97-8098-0-7-702	Education benefits fund	162,000
36-1024-0-1-704	Direct loan program account	34
36-1025-0-1-704	Loan guaranty program account	68,200
36-1025-0-1-704	Loan guaranty program account	100
36-1119-0-1-704	Guaranty and indemnity program account	14,100
36-1119-0-1-704	Guaranty and indemnity program account	134,900
36-0151-0-1-705	General operating expenses	0
36-8129-0-7-705	National cemetery gift fund	50
36-8180-0-7-705	General post fund, national homes	24,943
74-8569-0-7-705	Contributions	5,970
84-8463-0-8-705	Soldiers' and airmen's home revolving fund	(200)
84-8930-0-7-705	Soldiers' and airmen's home, payments of claims	5
Other mandatory		368,957
Function total		19,333,850
Administration of justice		
20-0602-0-1-751	Salaries and expenses	182,195
20-1407-0-1-751	Contribution for annuity benefits	38,232
20-8789-0-7-751	Refunds, transfers and expenses, unclaimed, and abandoned	14,000
95-8280-0-7-751	Gifts and bequests	0
10-0100-0-1-752	Salaries and expenses	1,596
10-0400-0-1-752	Salaries and expenses	1,303
10-0510-0-1-752	Salaries and expenses	1,709
10-0920-0-1-752	Salaries and expenses	164,757
10-0920-0-1-752	Salaries and expenses	8,196
10-0941-0-1-752	Payment to judicial trust funds	8,520
10-8123-0-7-752	Gifts and donations, Federal Judicial Center Foundation	221
15-0311-0-1-752	Fees and expenses of witnesses	82,328
15-0327-0-1-752	Independent counsel	4,500
15-0403-0-1-754	Public safety officers' benefits	28,013
Other mandatory		1,360,252
Function total		1,895,822
General government		
00-0100-0-1-801	Compensation of members, Senate	16,500
00-0115-0-1-801	Payments to widows and heirs of deceased members of Congress	130
00-0188-0-1-801	Congressional use of foreign currency, Senate	1,400
00-0200-0-1-801	Compensation of Members and related administrative expenses	71,800
00-0215-0-1-801	Payments to widows and heirs of deceased members of Congress	259
00-0488-0-1-801	Congressional use of foreign currency, House of Representatives	3,606
04-9990-8-1-801	Budget clearing account	0

Table 5. Entitlement and Other Mandatory Spending Outlays, by Budget Account, Estimates for Fiscal Year 1993

Account (Treasury identification number)	Account name	1993 outlays (thousands)
05-8269-0-7-801	Contributions	\$ 10
09-0500-0-1-801	International conferences and contingencies: House and Senate	440
09-8094-0-7-801	Contributions and donations	3
09-8275-0-7-801	John C. Stennis center for public service development trust fund	630
09-8292-0-7-801	Botanic Garden: gifts and donations	0
09-8300-0-7-801	Capitol preservation commission trust fund	74
11-0001-0-1-802	Compensation of the President	230
11-8240-0-7-802	Gifts and donations	629
11-8241-0-7-802	Donations for the official residence of the Vice President	0
20-0560-0-1-803	Administering the public debt	100,491
20-1710-0-1-803	Payment of government losses in shipment	312
20-8790-0-7-803	Gifts and bequests	750
88-8127-0-7-804	National archives gift fund	478
88-8436-0-8-804	National archives trust fund	(2,482)
24-0200-0-1-805	Payment to civil service retirement and disability fund	6,638,000
24-0200-0-1-805	Payment to civil service retirement and disability fund	13,175,000
24-9990-8-7-805	Offsetting receipts, payment to civil service retirement	(6,638,000)
24-9991-8-7-805	Govt. share of civil service retirement	(13,175,000)
14-0418-0-1-806	Payments to the United States territories, fiscal assistance	80,806
14-0412-0-1-808	Administration of territories	27,720
14-0412-0-1-808	Administration of territories	1,260
14-0415-0-1-808	Compact of free association	10,000
14-0415-0-1-808	Compact of free association	21,000
14-0415-0-1-808	Compact of free association	120,069
15-0329-0-1-808	Civil liberties public education fund	500,000
20-1895-0-1-808	Claims, judgments, and relief acts.	464,000
20-9971-0-7-808	Miscellaneous trust funds (Other general government)	44
55-8155-0-7-808	Contributions	200
Other mandatory function total		1,297,151
Total entitlements		\$ 47,797,676
Total other mandatory		22,219,339
Total entitlements and other mandatory spending		\$770,017,015

Source: Table prepared by CRS, based on CBO Dec. 1991 baseline estimates.

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 05018 490 0

ISBN 0-16-040844-X



90000



9 780160 408441